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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
JURISDICTION: Novid Co., Ltd. v. United States, 535 F.2d 5 (Ct. Cl.
1976).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2517 (1964) provides that every final judgment
rendered by the Court of Claims against the United States Government
is to be paid out of appropriated funds only. This section has been
applied to deny the Court of Claims subject matter jurisdiction over
certain contract claims. This case is a recent example.
Plaintiff Novid had entered into a contract with the United States
Government, the defendant, to construct housing in Iran at the
stipulated price of $900,000. The contract was authorized by two
"country-to-country" agreements between the United States and Iran.
These agreements provided that payments under the contract were to
be strictly limited to funds loaned to Iran by the defendant. These
funds, the proceeds from the sale of American commodities in Iran,
were placed in a special account in the Foreign Trade Bank of Iran.
The plaintiff, upon completion of the project, asserted several
claims against the contracting officer for an increase in the contract
price, but was granted only a fraction of its request. In accordance with
the "disputes" clause of the contract, Novid appealed the decision to
the "Head of Plan Organization, Government of Iran," who permitted
a slightly larger increase. The plaintiff thereupon filed this action in the
Court of Claims for the total requested amount.
The defendant Government attacked Novid's suit on the ground
that the Court of Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
contract claim. The Government relied on Kyer v. United States, 369
F.2d 714 (Ct. Cl. 1966). In Kyer the Court of Claims, relying on its
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2517, held that it was without jurisdiction
over a cause of action based on a contract funded by nonappropriated
funds. In other words, to be actionable in the Court of Claims, a
contract must be one which could obligate public funds. The Government asserted that the funds involved here were loans to the Iranian
Government and not property of the United States, and thus could not
be "appropriated funds." Thus, the defendant concluded, the Court of
Claims had no jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Novid, on the other hand, argued that since the loans to
Iran were derived from the sale of government-owned commodities
acquired with appropriated funds, the requirements of Kyer had been
sufficiently met. In addition, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant's
use of the Army Corps of Engineers and other "appropriated funds"
instrumentalities in negotiating and carrying out the contract, also
demonstrated a sufficient incidence of involvement of appropriated
funds.
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The Court of Claims rejected the plaintiff's arguments, stating that
the real question, in determining the court's jurisdiction, was whether
the contract was one which could have been satisfied out of appropriated funds. Since the "country-to-country" agreements limited the
contract payments to the special loan fund, the court determined that
appropriated funds were wholly insulated from liability in this matter.
Therefore, this claim was not one which the Court of Claims had
jurisdiction to hear.
JURISDICTION: McShan v. Omega Louis Brandt Et Frere, S.A., 536 F.2d
516 (2d Cir. 1976).
Is a Swiss corporation, which sells its products in the United
States through a totally independent distributor located in New York
City, subject to suit in New York for nonpayment of patent royalties?
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a suit
against such a foreign corporation, citing a lack of personal jurisdiction.
McShan, the owner of United States and foreign patents relating
to watch movements, brought suit against the defendant Omega, a
watch manufacturer, for failure to pay royalties. The defendant, a
Swiss corporation, had obtained the rights to manufacture, use and
sell inventions covered by the McShan patents by way of a sublease
agreement with the American Railroad Curvelining Corporation
[ARC], the original lessee of those rights. This agreement had been
signed in New York by ARC and sent to Switzerland for execution by
Omega. Omega distributed its watches in the United States through
the Norman M. Morris Corporation [Morris], a New York corporation.
Morris was a wholly independent legal entity, and purchased watches
from the defendant f.o.b. Switzerland. McShan obtained the right to
sue Omega through an assignment by ARC of its rights under the
sublease agreement.
Plaintiff McShan commenced the action in the New York Supreme
Court, and served process on the defendant at its principal office in
Switzerland. The defendant thereupon removed the action to the
federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York. That court
dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the foreign
corporation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It noted
that under New York law a foreign corporation comes within the
state's jurisdiction if it is "doing business" there with a "fair measure of
permanence and continuity." However, the court felt that the defendant did not come under this statute since it had neither an office nor a
place of business in New York. The plaintiff had asserted that the
location of the defendant's American distributor (Morris) and the
advertisement of its products in New York were sufficient to constitute
"doing business" under the test. The court rejected this on the basis of
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a prior New York case which had held that sales of a foreign
corporation's products in New York through an independent agency
did not make it amenable to suit, even though the products were
locally advertised.
The Court of Appeals also examined the plaintiff's claim of
personal jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute, which provides for personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where a cause
of action arises from the transaction of business in New York by the
nondomiciliary or its agents. The plaintiff had alleged that the signing
of the subleasing agreement by ARC had been a transaction of business
in New York, out of which his cause of action (the breach of the
subleasing agreement by the nonpayment of royalties) had arisen.
However, the court held that the long-arm statute required some
meaningful activity by the defendant in New York. Since Omega had
signed the subleasing agreement in Switzerland, this requirement of
the statute was not met.
Plaintiff McShan argued further for the application of the long-arm
statute. He maintained that the defendant, through the business
transactions of his distributor Morris, had indeed performed some
.meaningful activity in New York. The appellate court also dismissed
this argument, saying that the cause of action for the royalties did not
arise out of any of Morris' transactions in New York, and thus the
statute could not be applied. Morris was a complete stranger to the
subleasing agreement, which was the basis of McShan's claim, and the
payment of royalties by Omega was of no concern to Morris.

JURISDICTION: Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392 (2d
Cir. 1976).
Does an alien seaman, injured while aboard an alien defendant's
ship, have a cause of action under the Jones Act' or under general
maritime (admiralty) law, where the defendant shipowner's only
contact with the United States is the occurrence of the accident in
United States waters? The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held such contact insufficient to support jurisdiction, and affirmed the
dismissal of the seaman's claim.
Plaintiff Koupetoris, a Greek citizen and resident, brought suit
under the Jones Act and the general maritime law of the United States
to recover damages for personal injuries. These injuries were allegedly
sustained in 1974 off the coast of Maryland, during the course of the
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The pertinent parts are: "Any seaman who shall suffer
personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an
action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes
of the United States modifying or extending the common-law right or remedy in cases
of personal injury to railway employees shall apply;..."
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plaintiff's employment as a seaman aboard the Konkar Intrepid. This
was the only vessel owned by the defendant Konkar Intrepid Corp., a
Liberian corporation whose office and principal place of business was
in Athens, Greece. The defendant corporation was completely owned
by Greek citizens. Although not licensed to do business in New York
State, the defendant did maintain substantial financial ties there,
including two mortgages, at least one bank account, and an outstanding letter of credit. Furthermore, the defendant employed agents in
New York who were authorized to carry out banking activities and to
appoint husbanding agents.
The district court found that the activity of the defendant's New
York agents and its financial ties to that state were sufficient to meet
the requirements of minimum contacts, and thus, to render the
defendant amenable to suit in New York. Furthermore, the activity of
the New York agents was held to be substantial enough to allow
service of process on them as the general or managing agents for the
shipowner, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3). However,
the court found that there was no subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissed the case. In making that decision, the district court held that
there was no diversity jurisdiction where both the plaintiff and
defendant were aliens. The court also declined, in its discretion, to use
the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts because an alternative
forum (in Greece) was available to the plaintiff. Finally, the court
rejected the federal question argument for subject matter jurisdiction
by finding that the Jones Act was inapplicable on these facts.
The district court noted that suits under the Jones Act have been
limited to cases where the defendant had some substantial contact with
the United States. The following factors were considered in determining whether the contacts in this case were substantial: (1) the place of
the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the place where the
employment contract was made; (4) the inaccessibility of a foreign
forum; (5) the allegiance or domicile of the injured party; (6) the
allegiance or base of operations of the shipowner; and (7) the law of the
forum which has perfected personal jurisdiction. The court felt that the
first four criteria were insignificant and relied mainly on factors (5) and
(6). Since the plaintiff was not an American and since the shipowner
was not based in the United States, the court held their contacts to be
insufficient to invoke the Jones Act.
In affirming the district court's opinion, the court of appeals
reiterated the limited applicability of the Jones Act and reviewed the
factors determining the substantiality of the defendant's contact with
the United States. It said that the occurrence of "the Plaintiff's
injuries.., off the coast of the United States is purely fortuitous, and a
factor of minimal importance in supporting application of the Act."
The appellate court also approved the refusal of the lower court to use
its admiralty jurisdiction in this case.
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FISHERIES: United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976).
Is mens rea required to establish liability for foreign fishing within
the twelve mile limit in violation of 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-94? The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that it is not, and also decided
that failure to give the master of a foreign vessel a Miranda warning
before asking him to identify himself does not require a reversal of his
conviction.
The Cuban vessel of which defendant Ayo was master was
fourteen miles off the United States mainland when it was hailed by a
United States Coast Guard cutter and ordered to drop anchor. After
the fishing vessel had pulled in its gear and anchored, a boarding
attempt was made during which Ayo requested that the United States
fisheries agent on board the cutter contact the fishing flotilla commander. The fisheries agent asked Ayo if he was the captain, and Ayo
answered in the affirmative. After a later successful boarding attempt,
the United States agent assembled the crew and asked for the captain.
Ayo responded and was read his Miranda rights. Ayo waived his rights
and cooperated in trying to reconcile the situation. It was then
determined that Ayo, depending on radar information received from a
mother ship, believed he was outside of the United States fishery zone,
when in fact his position was eight miles from St. Joseph Island off the
Texas coast. The defendant opted for a bench trial in federal district
court and upon conviction appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
Ayo contended that evidence of his identity should have been
suppressed. One of the elements of the offense of which he was
convicted was that he was the "master or other person in charge," and
he maintained that this element was proved only by means of statements obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Ayo further contended that the district court's refusal to require even a showing of
negligence constituted error because (1) Congress did not intend to
punish innocent encroachments, or (2) if the statute does not require at
least negligence in order to be violated, it denies due process.
The court disposed of the Miranda question by concluding that the
identification of a foreign vessel's master was probably not covered by
the Miranda decision, but assuming arguendo that it was, that in this
case the admission of the challenged testimony was harmless error.
The facts of Ayo's identification to the fisheries agent prior to the
boarding, his immediate waiver of his rights once they were read, and
the relaxed rules of admissibility in a bench trial all contributed to the
court's holding.
On the mens rea issue the court found "persuasive evidence" that
Congress intended to impose strict liability, and found "no persuasive
indications.., of an intent to require some form of mens rea.'"Because
of the strong policy considerations involved, the lack of stigma
associated with conviction, the reasonableness of the statute under the
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circumstances, and the fact that the statutory crime is not taken from
the common law, the elimination of a criminal intent element was held
not violative of the due process clause.

ADMIRALTY: Matter of S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976).
In December 1968, the freighter Helena, owned by the Sincere
Navigation Corporation, collided with the United States Coast Guard
vessel, White Alder, on the Mississippi River in Louisiana territorial
waters. Seventeen of the twenty crewmen of the White Alder perished.
The three survivors, joined by relatives of most of the decedents, filed
complaints in a Louisiana state court seeking damages against Sincere
Navigation and its insurer. Sincere removed the case to the federal
district court on the basis of diversity.
It was not until April, 1972 that the district court decided in favor
of the survivors and decedents' relatives. Damages were awarded
according to the Louisiana wrongful death statute, which included
compensation for the surviving relatives' grief and mental anguish.
Sincere Navigation immediately appealed.
Sincere based its appellate argument on two Supreme Court cases
decided subsequent to the 1968 collision of the Helena and the White
Alder. The Court held in Moragne v. States Marines Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375 (1970), that a cause of action existed in general maritime law for
wrongful death. In Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), the
Court held that loss of society (e.g., love, affection, care, attention,
companionship, comfort, and protection) was compensable under the
Moragne cause of action, but that grief or mental anguish of the
decedents' surviving relatives was not. Sincere argued that Moragne
supplanted state wrongful death statutes for deaths occurring within a
state's territorial waters, and that Moragne and Gaudet should be
applied retroactively to the present case.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Sincere Navigation. In holding that Moragne precluded recognition of state wrongful
death statutes, the court reviewed the history of wrongful death
claims. There were two reasons generally given for the recognition and
enforcement of state wrongful death statutes in admiralty courts: there
was no cause of action in general maritime law, and there was federal
recognition of a special solicitude for a state's sovereignty within its
territorial borders. Moragne did away with the rationale for the first
reason, and with respect to the second, Moragne was "not as solicitous"
in that it "significantly interfered with the state schemes for wrongful
death recoveries." 529 F.2d 744 at 752. Thus, the court concluded, there
is no longer a need for recognition of state wrongful death statutes in
admiralty courts.
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The Fifth Circuit also held that Moragne and Gaudet were to be
applied retroactively. Were they not retroactive, argued the court, the
maritime law of negligence and unseaworthiness would have to be
enforced through state law, which is precisely what Moragne was
designed to prevent. The claimants, however, argued that state law
should apply since the Louisiana statute would allow them recovery
for mental anguish whereas Moragne and Gaudet would not. They
contended that they should not be denied this recovery after having
spent considerable time and money in the state proceedings, with a
view toward recovering damages to which they were legally entitled at
the time of the deaths. The court was not totally unsympathetic to their
plight, but nevertheless concluded that the new law should be given
greater weight than the extent to which the parties relied on the old
law.
The court also gave retroactive effect to United States v. Reliable
Transfer, 421 U.S. 397 (1975); See 1 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoMM. REG. 92
(1976). In that case, the Supreme Court held that liability for property
damages in maritime collisions was to be allocated among the parties
according to their relative degree of fault. The goal of Reliable Transfer
was to insure just and equitable allocation of damages, and the Court
concluded that its retrospective application would promote that goal in
this case.

ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE: United Bank Limited v. Cosmic International Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
The act of state doctrine has territorial limitations: the principle
under which United States courts refuse to examine the legality of an
act done by a foreign government applies only to an act done by that
foreign sovereign within its own territory. This restriction was applied
in United Bank v. Cosmic International to deny the government of
Bangladesh a recovery in a dispute between that country and several
Pakistani plaintiffs concerning the right to receive payment for jute
products exported from East Pakistan before it became the nation of
Bangladesh.
On April 10, 1971 a proclamation was issued in India which
declared that East Pakistan had become the sovereign state of
Bangladesh on March 26, 1971. However, it was not until December
16, 1971 that the ensuing revolution was quelled and the last Pakistani
troops surrendered, thus guaranteeing the sovereign status of the new
nation. In early 1972, the new government expropriated all property
owned by Pakistani citizens and also took over the ownership of all
banks. In neither case was any compensation provided to those
deprived of their property.
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The defendant Cosmic International [Cosmic], a New York corporation, had purchased, in two separate transactions, jute products
from the Nishat Jute Mills [Nishat] and Amin Jute Mills [Amin]. Both
Nishat and Amin were Pakistani corporations whose East Pakistani
interests (although incorporated in Pakistan, each had its mill located
in East Pakistan) were taken in the expropriations by the new
Bangladesh government.
The plaintiffs National Bank of Pakistan [National] and United
Bank Limited [United] financed the operations of Nishat and Amin
respectively. These banks were also incorporated in Pakistan and had
branch offices in East Pakistan through which the accounts of the two
jute mills were handled. As mentioned before, these branch banks
were expropriated, without any compensation to United or National.
Both mills were heavily indebted to their respective banks, and any
amounts they expected to collect from Cosmic would have been paid,
according to the financing agreements, to the banks to reduce the
debts.
Because of the confusing events taking place in Bangladesh,
Cosmic did not make payment for the jute products, although it did
readily admit the debt. Cosmic held two funds which represented the
proceeds from the sale of the jute products from each of the two mills.
Subsequently, Cosmic was sued in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York by several plaintiffs. The cases were consolidated
for a single trial. National and United each claimed the proceeds owed
to the mill which it financed. These claims were based on the
indebtedness of the mills and on the financing arrangements. The
funds were also claimed by Bangladesh which argued that, by virtue of
the expropriation orders, it was the successor in interest to all property
(including the debts owned by Cosmic) formerly owned by the
Pakistani corporations. Although Bangladesh acknowledged that no
compensation was paid for any of the Pakistani property purportedly
seized, it maintained that the act of state doctrine precluded American
courts from examining the propriety of any taking effected by
Bangladesh law.
The district court found that at the time of Bangladesh's attempted
seizure of the debts in question their situs was in New York. Since
Bangladesh was trying to take control of property not within its own
national boundaries, the territorial limitations precluded the application of the act of state doctrine to this case. With this doctrinal obstacle
removed, the court next looked at the propriety of the expropriations,
and, having done so, refused to give effect to the purported confiscations because no compensation had been paid. The district court said
that this was contrary to the public policy of the United States.
Judgment was entered in favor of the Pakistani plaintiffs.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Bangladesh maintained that the
situs of the debts was actually in Bangladesh (making the act of state
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doctrine applicable) and that the confiscations were consistent with
United States practice in the context of a wartime situation. Three
arguments were made to support the contention that these debts had
their situs within Bangladesh: (1) Cosmic's creditors were said to be
located there; (2) Bangladesh courts were alleged to have jurisdiction
over the debtor; and (3) the Cosmic debt secured the indebtedness of
the jute mills to the banks, and since these latter debts were located in
Bangladesh at the time of the seizure, Cosmic's obligation passed as an
incident to that taking. The appellate court found all of these arguments lacking in merit.
In response to the first "situs" argument, the court felt compelled
to follow an earlier decision, Menendez v. Saks and Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d
Cir. 1973). In Menendez the court held that a debt is not located within a
foreign state for purposes of the act of state doctrine, unless that state
has the power to enforce and collect it. In light of Cosmic's location in
New York, the Cosmic court felt that Bangladesh had no such power.
The court also ruled that Bangladesh's claim to jurisdiction over the
debtor was purely speculative. The third argument was rebutted by
saying that since territorial constraints and United States policy against
expropriations without compensation would have prevented
Bangladesh from seizing directly the Cosmic debts located in New York,
that country should not now be allowed to accomplish the same result
indirectly by first confiscating the corporate owners of the debts.
Having laid to rest the claims of a Bangladesh situs for the debts,
the court next answered the contention that the wartime practice of the
United States would allow these confiscatory takings. Although noting
that United States legislation and case law did allow confiscation of
enemy property, the court found that such seizures had been limited to
property within the United States. Therefore, confiscatory seizures of
an extraterritorialnature (such as Bangladesh sought here) were inconsistent with American policy. Based on these findings, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1976).
Traditionally, legal scholars and the courts have maintained that
rights expressed in treaties and in the doctrines of international law
can be enforced only by nations and not by individual plaintiffs. This
notion was reaffirmed in Dreyfus v. Von Finck to deny the claimant a
cause of action for the wrongful confiscation of his property.
The plaintiff, Willy Dreyfus, was a Swiss citizen and resident. In
1938 he was living in Germany and held an interest in the banking firm
of J. Dreyfus and Co. In that year Dreyfus was forced to emigrate,
because of his Jewish faith, to Switzerland. Before leaving Germany he
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sold his interest in the banking firm to the defendants, August Von
Finck and Merck, Fink & Co., allegedly under duress and at a price
which was $1.5 million below its actual value. After the war, Dreyfus
sought additional compensation, and a settlement was reached in
1948. However, the settlement was never satisfied, allegedly due to a
wrongful repudiation by the defendants. A second settlement was
reached in 1951 and the additional consideration was paid to Dreyfus.
The plaintiff brought the present action in 1973, basing the cause
of action upon the original taking of his property and the alleged
wrongful repudiation of the 1948 settlement. He argued that both of
these incidents violated four treaties or pacts to which the United
States was a party - The Hague Convention, The Kellogg-Briand Pact,
The Versailles Treaty, and The Four Power Occupation Agreement.
The suit was commenced in the District Court for the Southern District
of New York by attaching certain of the defendants' assets in New York
City. The defendants were, at all times relevant to this action, citizens
and residents of West Germany.
Because the plaintiff had made a colorable claim under the above
mentioned treaties, the district court held that it had subject matter
jurisdiction, under 23 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (jurisdiction in any civil action by an alien for a tort in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States), to determine
whether the complaint stated a cause of action on which relief could be
granted. After a review of the treaties, the district court dismissed the
complaint because it concluded that the treaties provided no private
right of recovery for the defendants' allegedly tortious conduct.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals again gave serious consideration as to whether the plaintiff had a cause of action under the treaties.
It also heard a new argument by the plaintiff that the seizure of his
property and the 1948 repudiation were torts which violated international law or the law of nations. With regard to the first contention, the
court stated that treaties may contain provisions conferring rights
upon citizens which are capable of enforcement like other private
rights, but that this was certainly not the general rule. After examining
the purposes of the four treaties relied on by the plaintiff, the appeals
court affirmed the earlier decision that no private right of action could
be based on these international agreements.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim of rights under international law, stating that international law dealt primarily with the
relationships among nations rather than among individuals. Furthermore, like a general treaty, the law of nations was not self-executing so
as to vest a plaintiff with individual legal rights. The Second Circuit
noted finally that, regardless of the status of the individual under the
law of nations, no violation of international law had occurred in this
case because the parties involved were nationals of the same state at
the time of the alleged tortious conduct.
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SHIPPING: Kraft Foods v. Federal Maritime Commission, 538 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
Is an ocean carrier's tariff provision, requiring that any claim for
adjustment of freight charges based on alleged errors in weight or
measurement be presented to the carrier in writing before the shipment involved leaves the custody of the carrier, invalid as being in
violation of the statute allowing a person to file a claim for reparation
with the Federal Maritime Commission [FMC] within two years after
the cause of action accrues? The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that such a tariff rule is not enforceable.
Plaintiff Kraft Foods sent a shipment of noodle dinners and
marshmallows to Supermarket, Ltd., the consignee, in Mombasa,
Kenya. The shipment was carried by Moore-McCormack Inc. The
transportation charges were prepaid and were based on a measurement of 284 cubic feet as shown on the bill of lading. Two days after
receiving the shipment, Supermarket notified Kraft that there was an
apparent overcharge, in that the true measurement of the shipment
was 145.01 cubic feet. Kraft then notified Moore-McCormack of the
error and asked for reparation. Moore-McCormack responded that the
original measurements were correct and that in any event the claim
was barred by its tariff rule. The Moore-McCormack tariff rule (referred
to as the South and East Africa Conference South Bound Freight Tariff
No. 1, Rule 16) said in effect, that claims for adjustment of freight
charges will not be considered unless presented to the carrier in
writing before the shipment leaves the custody of the carrier.
A hearing was held before an administrative law judge who
denied reparation on the ground that Kraft had failed to sustain its
burden of proof on the merits of the claim. On review, the FMC did not
reach the merits, but held that the tariff rule barred the bringing of the
claim. Kraft then made this appeal, contending that the tariff rule in
question conflicted with the provisions of 46 U.S.C. § 821. That statute
allows anyone to obtain relief from a carrier by commencing an
administrative proceeding before the FMC within two years of the
incident giving rise to the cause of action.
The appellate court agreed with Kraft and allowed it to reinstate its
claim for decision on the merits. It found that the tariff rule set up as a
period of limitation the time during which the shipment remained in
the custody of the carrier, and that such a limitation infringed on the
rights granted by 46 U.S.C. § 821. The court therefore held the tariff
rule invalid.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SHIPPING: Swedish East Asia Co., Ltd. v. Topp Electronics, Inc., 334 So.
2d 653 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1976).
Which carrier is liable, in a multi-carrier shipment, for loss of
goods where there is no evidence as to which of the carriers caused the
loss? An appellate court in Florida recently held that all of the carriers
were liable.
The plaintiff in the action, Topp Electronics, Inc. [Toppi, a
distributing company located in Miami, had contracted with defendant
Blue Sea Lines [Blue Sea] for the transport of fifty-eight shipments of
electronic equipment from the Far East to the Port of Miami. The
defendant acknowledged receipt of the merchandise in good order by
issuing a clean bill of lading for each of the fifty-eight shipments. Upon
arrival in Miami, the goods were unloaded by defendant Harrington &
Company [Harrington] and transported by defendant Land Trucking
Company [Land] to the plaintiff's warehouses, where it was discovered that shortages existed in fifty-six of the shipments.
Topp filed suit against the three carriers for failure to deliver. The
lower court held for the plaintiff against Blue Sea, apparently applying
the rule that a prima facie case is established by a shipper against an
ocean carrier and its agents by showing a clean bill of lading and proof
that the consignee did not receive the merchandise. The court rendered judgments in favor of the other two defendants, Harrington
and Land. Blue Sea appealed its judgment and Topp cross-appealed,
assigning as error the judgments for Harrington and Land.
The decision was reversed by the appellate court on the grounds
that the lower court had applied an incorrect principle of law. The
correct principle, according to the court, was that a carrier is solely
liable for a shortage of goods only where it can be shown that the
carrier delivered fewer goods than it actually received from the
shipper. Although the clean bills of lading were proof that Blue Sea
had received all of the shipments, it could not be proven that Blue Sea
alone was responsible for the shortages since the plaintiff discovered
the discrepancies only after the shipments had been handled by all
three of the carriers. The court of appeals, therefore, in holding against
all of the carriers, stated that all carriers in a multi-carrier shipment are
liable for a shortage of goods unless any one carrier can prove that the
shortage already existed when it received the goods. The case was
remanded so that the lower court might hear further testimony in light
of the principle announced by the appellate court.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: Draft Convention on the Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
116, Annexes I & 11 (1976).
When the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
[UNCITRAL] set up the Working Group on the International Sale of
Goods in 1969, the major purpose was to simplify the text of the
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods [ULIS1], which had
been annexed to the 1964 Hague Convention on Private International
Law. The old Uniform Law had met with severe criticism from several
developing nations which claimed that the law, drafted by twentyeight developed nations, put the developed nations in a more favorable position. The law was also criticized as being bloated with artificial
and complex concepts. Consequently, the old version of ULIS, which
came into force in 1972, had been ratified by only a few nations.
The Working Group completed a Draft Convention for a reform of
ULIS on January 16, 1976, and approved it by consensus with a few
minor reservations. The Group, representing a balance of developing
and developed countries, expressed the hope that the new ULIS would
help facilitate trade across national boundaries, reduce the impediments arising from conflicts between different nations' laws, and
better inform both vendor and buyer of their rights and obligations in
an international contract for the sale of goods. The Group also
emphasized the need to structure the revised law in the form of a draft
convention rather than a uniform law annexed to a convention, so as to
minimize the number of reservations taken upon ratification of ULIS.
The Draft Convention defines in Article 1 the contracts to which it
will apply: contracts for the sale of goods between parties whose places
of business are in different States, but only if those States have
adopted ULIS. The Commentary on the Draft Convention lists the
major goals of Article 1: (1) to reduce forum shopping; (2) to reduce
recourse to private international law (i.e., what common law lawyers
call conflicts of law); and (3) to provide a modern law of sales
"appropriate for transactions of an international character." Article 1,
interpreted in light of the goals expressed in the Commentary, could
bring an enormous number of sale of goods contracts under the Draft
Convention. However, specifically excluded from its application are
contracts for the sale of goods bought for personal use, by auction, or
by execution of law. Also excluded are contracts for the sale of stocks,
investment securities, negotiable instruments, money, ships, vessels,
aircraft or electricity. Article 4 permits both parties to a contract to
designate this Convention as the law governing their agreement. This
allows a business dealing with businesses in both adopting and
non-adopting States, still to obtain the benefit of a uniform law. Article
5 permits the parties to preclude application of any or all of the
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Convention, and it thus provides the flexibility needed for individual
contracts.
The scope of the revised law is limited, in that it applies only to the
rights and obligations of the parties under an existing contract, and not
to the formation and validity of the contract. The only provision
touching on formation and validity is Article 11, which states that the
contract need not be evidenced by writing and is not subject to form
requirements. Additional issues concerning the formation and validity
of contracts are currently being considered by the Working Group.
One obstacle to the wide-spread acceptance of ULIS is the likelihood of conflicting interpretations of the Law in different national
courts. Article 13 emphasizes the need for uniformity in interpretation
and declares that "regard is to be had to its international character." An
exception to this call for uniformity is in Article 12. This Article allows
national courts to grant the specific performance remedies, provided
for in Articles 27 and 43, according to the dictates of their own domestic
law. The remainder of the Convention concerns the rights and obligations of both the buyer and the seller, the measurement of damages,
the duty to mitigate damages, and the passing of risks.
Once the Draft Convention was approved by the Working Group,
it was sent to UNCITRAL-member governments and interested international organizations for review and comments. These comments will
be considered along with the Draft Convention at UNCITRAL's tenth
session to be held in Vienna from May 23 to June 17, 1977. During that
session UNCITRAL will prepare the final form of the Draft for
ratification.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: Draft Convention on the Carriage
of Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976), 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 901 (1976).
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
[UNCITRAL] has approved the Draft Convention on the Carriage of
Goods by Sea, which deals primarily with the liabilities of carriers to
shippers for damages caused by the loss, damage or delay of goods in
carriage at sea. Currently, such damages are governed by the 1924
International Convention of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading, otherwise known as the Hague Rules.
The Draft Convention defines the period of the carrier's responsibility to include the time he has taken over the goods until the goods
are handed over to the consignee, or placed at his disposal. The Draft
Convention also extends carrier responsibility to include live animals
and cargo carried on deck.
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The basis for the carrier's liability is set forth in Article 5, which
also enumerates the affirmative defenses available to the carrier. The
plaintiff need only show loss, damage or delay of goods which
occurred while the carrier was in charge of the goods, to set up a prima
facie case against the carrier. The one exception is damage caused by
fire, in which case the plaintiff must prove that the fire arose from the
carrier's negligence. If the carrier can prove that he and his agents
"took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the
occurrence and its consequences," then the carrier is free from liability.
The carrier is also absolved if any loss, damage or delay resulted from
measures taken to save life (human, most likely), or from reasonable
measures taken to save property. If the negligence of the carrier is
combined with other causes to produce loss, damage or delay, the
burden is on the carrier to prove the amount of damage which is not
attributable to its negligence.
The Draft Convention provides two methods for calculating a
carrier's limit of liability. The first method is based, in cases of loss or
damage, on a set figure per package or per kilograms of gross weight,
whichever is higher; and in cases of delay, on the freight payable for
the goods actually delayed. The second method sets a straight limit
based on the gross weight of the goods which are lost, damaged or
delayed. There is also a provision allowing the carrier and shipper to
agree on liability limits exceeding those provided in the Convention.
Neither the Convention limitations nor the specifically agreed limits
are applicable, however, where the carrier is shown to have caused the
damage intentionally or recklessly.
Articles 12 and 13, dealing with the liability of the shipper, require
the shipper to inform the carrier of any dangerous qualities of the
goods to be carried and to label the goods as such. The shipper is held
strictly liable for any damage resulting from the carriage of such goods,
if the shipper fails to inform the carrier and if the carrier does not
otherwise have knowledge of their dangerous nature. Moreover, if
these circumstances arise, the carrier has the right to unload, destroy
or render innocuous the dangerous goods if necessary.
Articles 14-16 codify the requirements concerning bills of lading.
Rules are laid down as to time of issuance, proper signatories,
contents, reservations and evidentiary effect.
The final part of the Draft Convention concerns the procedure for
claims arising from loss, damage or delay of goods. The consignee is
required to give written notice to the carrier of any loss or damage no
later than the day after the day that the goods were handed over to the
consignee, or within fifteen days if the loss or damage is not apparent.
Otherwise, the handing over of the goods is prima facie evidence of
proper carriage. A two-year statute of limitations is imposed on any
suit, the period of limitation commencing on the day on which the
goods were delivered or should have been delivered.
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Article 21 designates the proper jurisdiction for actions arising
from the Draft Convention. Suits may be brought in a jurisdiction
encompassing any of the following places: (1) the defendant's principal
place of business; (2) the place where the contract was completed, if the
defendant has a place of business there; (3) the ports of loading or
discharge; or (4) any place designated as the proper forum in the
contract. Any forum selection clause in the contract of carriage will be
binding on the parties. The parties may also expressly provide for
referral of claims to arbitration. If this avenue is chosen, the rules of the
Draft Convention are to be applied by the arbitrator, even if the parties
expressly agree otherwise, unless the agreement relating to arbitration
was made after the claim arose.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PRACTICES: The United Nations
Commission on Transnational Corporations: Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices.
During the past two years evidence of corrupt or questionable
business transactions has arisen on every continent. The scandals have
involved high public officials and respected multinational corporations
and have caused serious consequences in many countries. The United
Nations is now seeking to prevent the further use of corrupt practices
in international trade.
In December of 1974 a Commission on Transnational Corporations
was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council
[ECOSOC]. This Commission began, in March of 1976, to promulgate a
code of conduct for the activities of transnational corporations. Klaus
Sahlgren, the Executive Director of the United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations, has said that the code is designed to
"maximize the contributions that these corporations can offer to
development and to minimize their negative effects."
At the same time that this code of conduct is being prepared, a
special working group has been set up specifically to study corrupt
practices of global corporations. This working group is also under the
authority of the Economic and Social Council. Its first meeting was
held in November of 1976, and its report of concrete recommendations
to the ECOSOC is due in July or August, 1977.
Several classes of improper payments are the subject of the study
by the Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices. These
include: (1) bribery of public officials by businesses seeking to gain
favorable treatment or to match the bribes paid by competitors; (2)
extortion by public officials who require businesses subject to their
regulation to pay them directly or to make political or even charitable
contributions; (3) inflated agent's fees, especially where such fees are
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insulated from scrutiny by questionable accounting practices; (4) slush
funds; (5) the practice of petty payments to administrative officials in
order to "expedite" routine action; and (6) kickback schemes.
The United States has already presented one approach to these
problems. It has urged a treaty-regulated system of public disclosures
of a defined class of payments. The theory is that public access to
records of payments will deter corrupt practices.

